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Jesus Christ and the Modern
Sinner: Karl Earth's Retrieval of
Luther's Substantive Christology
Amy Ellen Marga
Luther

Seminary

Despite Karl Barth*s lasting commitment
to the Reformed tradition of John Calvin, it
is the thought of Martin Luther that casts a
long shadow over Barm's theology. As
George Hunsinger points out.
At certain vital points Barth follows Luther not
only, broadly speaking, against Calvin and the
Reformed tradition, but also against the main
lines of the Lutheran tradition. There are points,
in other words, where Barth actually retrieved
Luther in order to stand \\ ith him not onl\ against
modernity, but also against the rest of the Reformation.1
If we refocus the historical lens upon
Barth and Luther, they can be seen to stand
like bookends on the shelf of the modern
age. with Luther standing at the beginning
of what historians now call "early modernity," and Barth standing at its end. 2 Barth
looked back for the sake of looking forward
and in so doing engaged in intense study of
Luther. Barth absorbed aspects of Luther's
theology that allowed him to articulate
Christian theology in deeper and more sophisticated ways over against modernity,
which had through the course of the Enlightenment set the criteria for how we
know what we know and thus how we
articulate the sinner's relationship to Jesus
Christ. As Hunsinger has noted. Barth
"almost alone among modern theologians"
granted "uncompromising precedence to

the Reformation over modernity itself."
He did not reject modernity, but he "refused to allow secular epistemologie s to set
the terms for the validity of the gospel." 3
Barth"s mature Christology. seen in
his Church Dogmatics, vol. IV. published
in the early 1950s, has been a central channel into comparisons of his theology with
that of Luther. Both Karin Bornkamm and
Gerhard Ebeling have demonstrated that
Luther and Barth share a Christocentrism
in the best sense: clearly this was one thing
Barth learned from Luther. Bornkamm has
shown how Barth transformed Luther's
conception of the offices of Christ as priest
and king for the sake of forging a relationship between Christology and soteriology .4
1. George Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace:
Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand
Rapids. MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans. 2000). 282.
2. W. Stacy Johnson, among others, has
even suggested that Barth"s theology contains
the seeds for postmodern theology. See his
The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology (Louisville.
KY: Westminster John Knox. 1997).
3. Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace. 293.
4. Karin Bornkamm. "Die reformatorische Lehre vom Amt Christi und ihre
Umformung durch Karl Barths." in Luther und
Barth. Veröffentlichung der Luther-Akademie
Ratzeburg. Vol. 13. ed. Joachim Heubach
(Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag. 1989). 144.

Currents in Theology and Mission 34 4 (August 200 )

Marga Jesus Christ and the Modern Sinner
261
Ebeling traces the christological impulses
that Barth took from Luther, even while
Barth formed his own criticisms of the
Reformer in the Church Dogmatics.5 But
Barth had already begun retrieving aspects
of Luther's Christology almost thirty years
earlier. One example of this is a lecture that
Barth gave in 1929 in Münster on theology
and ethics titled "The Holy Spirit and the
Christian Life." After a decade that included two lecture cycles in dogmatic theology and intense engagement with Roman
Catholic theology. Barth dove into the
works of Augustine, Calvin, and Luther.
The result was a lecture on theology and
ethics titled "The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life" that displays Barth's deepening
understanding of Luther's Christology.
In this essay I briefly present Luther's
Christology from his 1535 Galatians commentary6 and show how Barth reached back
to retrieve this for his own theology despite
the drastically different epistemological
landscape of the two thinkers brought about
by the Enlightenment. Barth reached over
Enlightenment notions of rationality and
morality to retrieve Luther's substantive
Christology, and in so doing he left behind
the psychological and historical interpretations of the person and work of Christ by
thinkers such as Werner Elert and Karl
Holl. Luther's theology provided Barth
with the resources to pull Christology out
of the grip of Enlightenment understandings of the individual as an autonomous
agent and show that reconciliation of the
human to God by God and through God
alone need not be beholden to modern
theories of rationality or morality.

Martin Luther's Christology
in the Galatians commentary
The richness of Martin Luther's Christology has provided scholars with a wide
variety of angles from which to analyze it.

Ebeling has tried to capture its expanse
under the terminology of a "forensic-antithetical*' Christology." Finnish scholars
such as Tuomo Mannermaa have focused
their attention on the aspect of deification
in Luther's early work.8 Bernhard Lohse.
and in more detail Ian Siggins. have approached Luther ' s Christology from a more
inductive angle,9 laying out the wide span
of images that Luther employed, from his
appropriation of motifs of Augustine and
Bernard of Clairvaux to his borrowings from
medieval piety and the New Testament.10
This variety, however, does not weaken
two fundamental commitments visible in
all aspects of Luther's Christology: his
commitment to the Chalcedonian formula
and his commitment to human salvation as
the central function and purpose of Christ's
person and work. These two commitments
are summed up in the Small Catechism: "I
believe that Jesus Christ, true God. begotten of the Father in eternity, and also a true
human being, born of the Virgin Mary, is
my Lord. He has redeemed me, a lost and
condemned human being.*'11
5. Gerhard Ebeling. Lutherstudien, vol. 3
(Tubingen: Mohr. 1985). 495-506.
6. Luther wrote this commentary in
1531. but it was not published until 1535.
7. Ebeling. LutherStudien, vol. 3. 539-46.
8. See. for example. Der im Glauben
gegenwärtige Christus. Rechtfertigung und
Vergottung (Hannover: Lutheran-VerlagHaus. 1989).
9. See Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther's
Theology: Its Historical and Systematic
Development (Minneapolis: Fortress. 1999).
and Ian D. Kingston Siggins. Martin Luther's
Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970).
10. See Lohse. Martin Luther's
Theology, 220. notes 8. 9.
11. Luther's Small Catechism, in The
Book of Concord, ed. Robert Kolb and
Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress.
2000), 355.
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The first commitment, seen in the
words "true God and true human being."
points to the ancient christological dogma
from the Council of Chalcedon in 451.
which established that the one person of
Christ is constituted by two natures, divine
and human, unconfusedly. unchangeably,
indivisibly. and inseparably. The second
commitment is to soteriology. seen in the
words "He has redeemed me, a lost and
condemned human being." Luther rarely
speaks of the person of Christ without referring to his saving work on our behalf.
The name Christ means reconciliation of
the sinner to God; Christ is reconciliation.
Luther's double commitment to the
Chalcedonian formula and to the explicit
salvific function of Christ has been called
by Hunsinger a "substantive" Christology. 12
Christ as very God and very human is the
sole agent who initiates and fully completes the reconciling action that takes place
between God and the human. No other
component or action is necessary in a substantive Christology for reconciliation to
be "real" for the human individual.
An account of the substantive nature
of Luther's Christology can be seen in his
Galatians commentary, where he writes.
For you do not yet have Christ even though you
know that He is God and man. You truly have
Him only when you believe that this altogether
pure and innocent Person has been granted to
you b\ the Father as your High Priest and Redeemer, yes. as your slave. Putting offHis innocence and holiness and putting on your sinful
person. He bore your sin. death, and curse: He
became a sacrifice and a curse for you. in order
thus to set you free from the curse of the Law.
(Luther's Works [hereafter LUT 26:288)
When Christ steps before God in our place
as the sinner to be punished, he not only
initiates but also completes our being made
righteous in God's eyes. There is no other
process outside of Christ alone that initiates and completes the justification of

sinners. Neither the sanctification of the
sinner nor the workings of the Holy Spirit
in the Christian life functions the way that
Christ's saving work does—a saving work
that is embodied in Christ's very person.
Christ's person embodies the precedence
of God's grace over any "good works" of
our own. Luther states. "Christ took the
initiative. . . . He did not find a good will or
a correct intellect in me. but He Himself
took pity on me. . . . By a mercy that preceded my reason, will and intellect. He
loved me . . . so much that He gave Himself
for m e " (LU7 26:175).
Reconciliation begins with Christ
alone. And it is completed in Christ alone:
". . . victory over sin and death, salvation
and eternal life . . . come . . . by Jesus Christ
alone"(p. 138). There is no gradual getting
better or gradual transformation in the sinner. Justification is not completed by a
process of sanctification. It is this onceand-for-all sense of Christ's person and
actions on our behalf that makes Luther's
Christology a substantive Christology. His
actions need no enhancement or outside aid
and do not continue upon some gradual
scale within the human being. What Christ
began. Christ fully completes for us.
The righteousness that comes to us
through Christ's reconciling act is a righteousness that brings with it its own new
life. We are given a life that is not our own.
for Christ's own righteousness acts upon
us. takes us over. It decenters and destabilizes the center of our own egos, for it is the
righteousness of Christ's person and not of
our own person. Luther claims. "I do indeed live in the flesh, but I do not live on the
basis of my own s e l f (LW 26:170-71).
When we live in Christ, we are no longer
the one who controls this reality in our
lives. The presence of the person of Christ
12. Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace. 284.
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displaces ourselves as the center of our
lives. We cannot scale this reality in our
lives down to a size that we can grasp and
thus control, for the righteousness of Christ
does not become a quality that inheres
within the human being (cf. LW 26:127).
nor is it somehow infused into the human to
give him or her a new identity as nonsinner. It is a reality that remains distinct
from us and greater than ourselves.
Indeed, the new life in Christ thrusts
individuals into an existence of contradictions: We are now saints while still being
sinners. As Luther states, when we believe
the good news that Christ died for us, we
"are reckoned as righteous, even though
sins, and great ones at that, still remain in
us" (LW 26:234). Thus, although Christ
starts and finishes our reconciliation with
God, we, living in the here and now, do not
shed our old sinful ways. We are not rid of
our sin. Luther writes,

T

he new life
in Christ
thrusts individuals into
an existence of contradictions: We are now
saints while still being
sinners.

''Christ Himself is the life that I now live"
(p. 167). The mediator comes to us continually. "Today Christ is still present to
some," Luther states, "but to others He is
still to come. To believers He is present
and has come: to unbelievers He has not yet
come" (p. 240). Thus, there is a clearly
These tu o things are diametrically opposed: that actualistic element in Luther's Christology
a Christian is righteous and beloved by God, and that modern theology can draw upon. Christ
yet that he is a sinner at the same time. For God
cannot deny His own nature. That is. He cannot does not remain in static. Aristotelian catavoid hating sin and sinners: and He does so by egories but spans the divide between God
necessity, for otherwise He w ould be unjust and and human, between past, present, and fuwould love sin. (p. 235)
ture, between action and substance, beThis is the heart of Luther's classical doc- tween saint and sinner. Luther's Christ is
trine of the simul iustus et peccato?'. In this the One who comes, who is coming.
The mechanism that binds the reconlife, we live a life of opposites. of being a
ciled sinner to Christ is faith. This is a core
saint and sinner at the same time.
God does not abandon us to the tension aspect of Luther's Christology in the Galaof saint and sinner, however. Christ's own tians commentary. "Through faith, the
presence to the reconciled sinner never human participates in this saving reality of
Word. This
ceases. It is an ongoing event. He is our Christ who is present in the
13
44
'pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by faith is a union with Christ." Luther writes,
night' [Ex. 13:21 ] to keep God from seeing . . . these three things are joined together: faith.
our sin" (p. 232).
Christ and acceptance or imputation. Faith takes
In that Luther emphasized Christ as hold of Christ and has Him present, enclosing
the mediator, he was able to express the
work of Christ in both the past, what he did
13. Marc Lienhard. Martin Luthers
as mediator for us on the cross, as well as in christologisches Zeugnis (Göttingen:
the present, what Christ does for us today: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1973^ 217.
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Him as the ring encloses the gem. And w hoever natural human capacity to understand or to
is found having this faith in the Christ who is comprehend in the way it understands obgrasped in the heart, him God accounts as righjects around itself. Luther disputes the
teous. (LW 26:132)
"Sophists" on this point, arguing that even
This faith is inseparably connected to though the "natural endowments" of huChrist's personal presence to us and to the man reason are capable of mastering physidestabilized lives that we live as the simul cal, civic, and political matters, the intellect
iustus et peccator. Faith is the epistemo- is in fact corrupt and inept in matters of the
logica! underpinning of Luther's under- knowledge of God. A completely other
standing of the "I yet not I" in Christ. "The form of "comprehending" is necessary in
life I live. I live on the basis of faith," order for knowledge of God to arise in the
Luther states. "For the time of life that I am human being. When we discuss faith.
living I do indeed live in the flesh, but not Luther states, "we are in an altogether difon the basis of the flesh and according to ferent world—a world that is outside reathe flesh, but in faith, on the basis of faith, son" (LW 26:234).
and according to faith" (LW 26:170).
Nonetheless, faith neither destroys reaBut this inseparable connection to son nor renders it impotent in its own sphere.
Christ's personal presence is not depicted Faith is essentially a different kind of ratioas some kind of mystical union with Christ nality, an "understanding" that moves beor "spiritual" faculty that then allows the yond reason: it has its source and function
believing human to make inspired state- in a manner different from natural human
ments about God (LW 26:28-29:287). Al- reason.
though Christ is present to us through faith,
he still remains beyond the reach of natural Karl Barth and the modern
human reason, in the "cloud of faith" (p. challenges to Christology
287). Luther states, "how [Christ] is present The Enlightenment s turn to the subject.
—this is beyond our thought: for there is The period of the Enlightenment brought
darkness" (p. 130). Thus, it is precisely the with it a sustained focus upon the human
concept of faith that maintains the distinc- individual as an independent, rational, and
tion between Christ and the reconciled sin- moral agent. The intense scrutiny upon the
ner. It maintains the distance between workings of the human mind and the rise of
Christ's mediating activities and the natu- science in the Enlightenment made it alral activity of our human intellect, which, most impossible for twentieth-century theofinally, are still under the control of sin. logians to bring together in theological
death, and the devil. As Marc Lienhard anthropology the incompatible opposites
puts it. "Christ is a reality "pro nobis' and of the "I yet not I." the saint-sinner of
*in nobis' but he is and remains * extra Luther ' s theology, or even the Chalcedonian
nos."*14 Christ is in us and for us but re- formula of Christ as very God and very
mains as a reality outside of us. And. man. and still be taken seriously. Further,
because Christ remains outside of us. he is theologians no longer could claim that hubeyond our rational and moral control.
Thus, faith cannot be understood to be
14. Lienhard. Martin Luthers chnstoidentical with human reason. For Luther, logisches Zeugnis. 290.
faith is a "mode of cognition" that is not
15. See Brian Gerrish. Grace and
identical to human reason.15 Faith is not the Reason (Oxford: Clarendon. 1962). 82.
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man knowledge of God was a distinct but
still true and valid "knowledge." for it does
not arise from logical thinking, scientific
experiment, and mathematical reasoning.
"Faith" as a form of knowledge proved
no match for the Enlightenment concept of
human rationality. Indeed, the distinction
that Luther made between faith and reason
was possible because the concept of natural
human rationality had not yet been elevated
to the normative status that it was in the
Enlightenment. Before the Enlightenment
insistence that morality and rationality obey
certain rules of logic and science, there was
still room for Christ to be an ''effective
Subject"' in the rational, moral agent.16 As
the effective Subject in humans, Christ
imputed his righteousness to us through
faith. He was the reference point for rational thinking and moral decision making in
faith. In Luther's theology, Christ was the
reference point for every "good work" that
came from the human individual, and good
w orks were understood as a consequence
of the immediacy and activity of Christ
within the believing sinner. This immediacy and activity kept the human rational
ego decentered. allowing it to be a moral
subject only by virtue of the "I yet not I."' It
did not stand on its own two feet.
The Enlightenment transformation of
the understanding of human rationality
hustled Christ the effective Subject out of
theories of knowledge. This can be seen
clearly in the thought of Descartes. Although the Christian tradition was no
stranger to a sense of inwardness (Augustine had already found a way to God through
a flight inward), it was anchored in the
human subject's connection to God—in
Luther's case, to the effective and personal
presence of Christ in faith. Descartes loosed
the inwardness of the human subject from
its divine mooring, making it no longer
necessary for human reason to operate solely

by virtue of reference to the divine presence. He assigned a power—the power of
"self-mastery'"—to human reason that excluded any possibility of conceiving the
human ego as decentered.1" Human reason
was unified, and effective in and of itself:
no other effective Subject operated within
it. The "I yet not I" central to Luther's
Christology was lost.
Immanuel Kant took Descartes' understanding of the autonomy of reason one
step further, proposing that the very nature
of "reason" meant that one behaves in an
ethical manner as well.18 He pulled morality into the orbit of the Enlightenment notion of reason, endowing the human with
an unprecedented sense of moral freedom.
This autonomous morality was "accessible
and accepted by every moral agent:"19 the
human individual him- or herself, without
any mediating presence from a divine subject, had the capacity to act according to
one's "good will." The moral nature of
humans became rooted in autonomous reasoning, thus excluding any need or possibility that an external force or being could
work upon the human to make one into a
moral being.
Charles Taylor has judged Kant " s moral
theory to be "a powerful... .revolutionary
force in modern civilization. [His idea]
seems to offer a prospect of pure self16. Bengt Hagglund. "Luthers Anthropologie." in Leben und Werk Martin Luthers
von 1526 to 1546. Festgabe zu seinem 500.
Geburstag. Vol. 1 (Góttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht. 1983). 74.
17. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1989). 147.
18. See Kant's Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Harper
Torchbooks. Harper and Row. [1785] 1964).
19. Manfred Kuhn. Kant: A Biography
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2001). 285.
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activity, where my action is determined . . .
ultimately by my own agency as a formulator of rational law." 20 Natural reason itself
is an instrument that formulates and sets
moral principles: it alone obligates humans
to do good works. It alone produces righteousness.
The philosophical consensus about
human rationality and morality ushered in
by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant
and Descartes was worlds apart from the
early modern understanding of the human
of Luther's era, where rationality reached
its limit in relationship to the divine being
and where morality was made possible b \
nothing other than the divine action.
Lutheran theology and the "face" of Jesus
Christ. While the Enlightenment granted
a new autonomy to human reason, it could
do so only by limiting reason to the sphere
proper to it. namely, the sphere of history.
"Reason" could no longer draw credible
conclusions about anything that lay outside
history and the logical sequence of events
that make history. Speaking of Jesus as
true God and true man became impossible.
Credible speaking of Jesus Christ was restricted to speaking of Jesus the man. Jesus
the historical figure, the divinity of whom
could be established only from what we
know about his humanity "from below." 21
Throughout the nineteenth century into the
early twentieth, leading thinkers such as
Elert promoted Christologies based solely
on Christ's historical appearance, on the
"face" of Christ. His physical presence—
his 'face'—was the only reality of God that
humans needed to see. In the life of Jesus
as a purely historical figure, humans have
the full, visible, complete face of God directly and immediately before them. Jesus
Christ did not reveal a God behind and
beyond himself. His person and work were
not considered revelation. 22

Because modern Protestantism did not
think in terms of the God outside history,
the Christology of a Lutheran like Elert did
not seek a Christ who mediated between
humans and a God who was perceived as an
ultimately unknowable metaphysical "Father." The face and life of the historical
Jesus was enough for natural human reason
to discover and know God in God's fullness. This kind of intense focus upon
history, and the rather uncritical and naive
trust in history and human reason that accompanied it. was prevalent among Protestant thinkers of Barth's da\. The substantive
Christology of Luther lay buried deep in
the layers of history, which makes the fact
that Barth retrieved this aspect from Luther
all the more remarkable.
Barth' s retrieval of a substantive Christology. Already in Barth's early theology
from the decade of the 1920s, before he
even considered writing the massive Church
Dogmatics (first begun in 1932). he displayed a keen interest in the theology of the
Reformation, but he harbored doubts about
the accuracy of his Lutheran contemporaries' representation of Luther's theology.2"1
The Protestantism of the era. with its strong
historicizing and psychologizing tenden-

20. Taylor. Sources of the Self. 364.
21. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in
the nineteenth Centwy 1870-1914. vol. 2 (New
Haven: Yale Universitt Press. 1985). 157.
22. Werner Elert. Die Lehre des
Luthertums im Abriß (Munich: Beck. 1924).
29. For a similar Lutheran perspecm e. see
Paul Althaus. "Theologie und Geschichte. Zur
Auseinandersetzung mit der dialektischen
Theologie." in Zeitschrift für systematische
Theologie 1 (1923/24): 771. See also Barth's
Unterricht in der christliche Religion, vol. 2
(Zurich: Theologischer Verlag Zurich. 1990).
par. 15:22. for his references to Elert and
Althaus. (Hereafter Unterricht)
23. Unterricht 15:23: 28:29-30.
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cies evident in thinkers like Elert, was
completely inadequate for truthful talk of
the God of Jesus Christ. After the outbreak
of World War I and the profoundly disturbing involvement of leading Protestant theologians in justifying the aggression of the
German nation, Barth could no longer accept a doctrine of revelation that read God's
actions and intentions directly from the
events of history. The Lutheran view that
only the humanity of Jesus Christ was a
positive and direct revelation of God on the
surface of history became unacceptable to
him.24 If Jesus Christ was the true Savior,
God had to be at work in him. The historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth needed to be
part of something greater than himself.
In his preparations for his seminal cycle
on dogmatic theology, begun at the University of Göttingen in 1924, Barth discovered for himself the ancient Chalcedonian
Christology by which Christ was truly God.
truly human, unmixed, undivided, unconfused, and unseparated.25 What this discovery did was allow Barth to move his theology
beyond the historical, psychological ghetto
of modern Christology and closer to that of
Luther,26 closer to a substantive Christology in which Christ's own person and work
starts and completes our reconciliation with
God.27 Precisely because humans come to
know Jesus Christ as both God and man, his
saving actions on our behalf are a real and
effective reconciliation:
That Jesus Christ is this one, the incarnated
Logos God. is the absolute decisive presupposition for his work... . One can not interpret the
officium mediatorium, the completion of reconciliation between God and the human, one will
alw ays misinterpret it if one does not previously
know who the mediator, who the completer is in
this act, who the representative of this officium
is. The work of Christ has its very particular
character, its very particular qualification, its
very particular gradient determined through that
which is effective here, through the very union
with God which Christ finds himself in.28

Contrary to his Lutheran contemporaries. Barth established that Christ's work
cannot be understood on the basis of the
historical figure of Jesus alone. Knowing
who Christ is and what Christ does comes
only from knowing that he is united to the
Father as very God and very human.
"The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life."
In 1929, five years after his first lectures in
Göttingen, Barth pushed even more against
psychologized, historicized Christology in
a lecture he gave at a theological conference in Elberfeld. Germany, titled "The
Holy Spirit and the Christian Life." Using
Luther. Barth demonstrated here how a
substantive Christology of Jesus Christ the
mediator functions as a critique of the Enlightenment understanding of the human as
a rational, moral agent. Barth's targets
were soteriologies like that of Holl, whose
emphasis on Christianity as a religion of
''conscience'' essentially canceled out any
need for a substantive Christology.
In an essay on Luther's doctrine of
justification, Holl argued against the traditional substantive Christology of Luther.
To Holl. the contradiction between the holy
God and the sinful human could not be
solved by simply pointing to Christ's person and work as the mediator between
them.29 God meets the sinner with the in24. Unterricht 15:22.
25. Unterricht 6:169. 193: 28:46.
26. Unterricht 6:169, 193: 28:46.
27. Unterricht 29:75.
28. Unterricht 29:75. See also Bruce
McCormack's work on this aspect of Barth's
dogmatics in his Karl Barth's Critically
Realistic Dialectical Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1995). 327ff.
29. Karl Holl. Die Rechtfertigungslehre
in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief mit
besonderer Rückblick auf die Frage der
Heilsgewissheit in Kirchengeschichte. vol. 1:
Luther (Tubingen: Mohr. 1921). 91-130.
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tenti on to forgive and transform "the human into his own image." 3U Christ does not
represent this intention and therefore does
not function as a mediating "third thing" in
the meeting of God and the sinner. God's
intention can turn into actual forgiveness
only when the human's own intentions and
actions turn toward the good. Thus. God
actually meets not the sinner but rather the
human as moral agent who strives to fulfill
the Law—as a doer of good works. Reconciliation of God and the human is therefore
not an event where the enmity between
God and the sinner is resolved: it is merely
a "meeting of good wills." God justifies the
one who is already justified. 31 The completion of reconciliation depends, finally, upon
the moral fiber of the autonomous individual. The transformation of the individual into the imago Dei may or may not
take place: justification is the "foundation
for a new life." but it is up to the individual
to gradually get better. 32
Such a moralistic soteriology rejects
the central role of Christ as mediator between God and the sinner. It has no need
for a substantive Christology because "sin"
is no longer perceived as a devastating
ontological force. Sin is a misguided good
will, but a good will nevertheless. The
human rational agent remains rational and
able to make moral decisions, even as a
sinner, for rationality contains morality
within itself. Sin is merely a discrepancy
between rationality and morality whereby
sinful actions occur when human moral
intentions do not follow reason.
To Barth, however, the rational and
moral constitution of the autonomous individual does not help us get better and better.
Sin brings the rational, moral agent to his or
her knees. Sin is about the rational, moral
agent's own struggle against God: it is
human resistance to grace, not a description of intentions. The struggle against this

enmity toward God is undertaken by Christ
and Christ alone, the Reconciler Spirit.
Using Luther's simul iustus et pec cat or.
Barth expresses the externality of Christ's
work upon us. The human
will never cease to acknowledge and confess, in
all seriousness, that one's having been justified
is utterly not in oneself, and consequently not m
one's human unbelief. Indeed, the Christian is
simul peccator et Justus and the surmounting of
this irreconcilable contradiction does not lie in
the Christian .. . but is the action of the Word of
God. the action of Christ, w ho is always the One
who makes one out to be a sinner, in order to
make one (though a sinner) into a righteous
[hu]man."
Not we but Christ conquers our "radical
evil and hate" toward the living God. 34
This retrieval of a substantive Christology had implications for both human
reason and human morality. Barth countered the rationalism in contemporary theories of justification using the terminology
of reason itself. He argued that the only
activity that humans can ever really know
is our own. Human rationality, therefore,
only perpetuates our enmity toward God.
Our insistence upon our own limited, selfenclosed rationality, and on controlling
everything through our reason, does not
bring us knowledge of God's work in Christ.
In "The Holy Spirit and the Christian
Life" he writes that reason, "in its unbelief,
in its stubbornness, in its meek self-righ-

30. Holl. Die Rechtfertigungslehre. 99.
31. Holl. 97-98.
32. Holl. 98.
33. Holl. 31: Barth. -Der Heilige Geist
und das christliche Leben."" in Karl-Barth-Gesamtausgabe. Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten
1925-1930. Ill (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag
Zurich. 1994). 495.
34. Barth. "The Holy Spirit and the
Christian Life."" trans. R. Birch Hoyle
(Louisville. KY: Westminster/John Knox.
1993). 19.20.
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teousness. in which it wishes to remain by
itself . . . does not wish to hear of some
thing radically different from its own work
ings" (pp. 19, 20). The exercise of reason
does not bring us insight into God's activi
ties: "What we can make evident to our
selves is always our own activity. Even when
we set this under the prefix of grace, it still
remains our own working*' (pp. 24-25).
With these claims, Barth locates a
'"blind spot" in human rationality that can
be filled only by Christ, for it is Christ alone
who mediates himself to us through a "con
tinual giving" of himself into faith, whose
righteousness is "established as true in our
flesh" (p. 29). In so doing. Barth reintro
duces Christ as the effective Subject, so
significant to Luther's theology, into an
understanding of the modern sinner in rela
tion to God. The rational agent is indeed
subject, but a subject whose agency has
limits in relation to God's reconciling ac
tivity. It is "I yet not Γ* who comes to know
God.
Barth further buttresses his argument
against the abilities of human reason before
God by qualifying the ability oí faith as a
mode of cognition, lest it too be swallowed
up by the all-encompassing Enlightenment
conceptions of reason. Even faith is "hidden from itself (p. 30: emphasis added).
Rational thought cannot not make "faith"
into a living knowledge of God. This is the
task of the Holy Spirit: "but the two things,
the acknowledgement of this contradiction
[sin] and the knowledge of its being surmounted, are not our own business, but are
the Holy Spirit's"(p. 31). Here. too. Barth
does not allow the human "I" to take control of one * s own faith. Faith is mediated to
the human by God and cannot be swallowed up by one's sense of self as agent.
The destabilizing "I yet not I" remains
central to the identity of the believing Christian.

Β

arth reintro
duces Christ
as the effective Subject,
so significant to
Luther's theology, into
an understanding of the
modern sinner.
In his retrieval of a substantive Christ
ology Barth also challenged the Enlighten
ment conception of a reasonable,
autonomous morality, and destabilized the
human as a moral agent. When Christ is
understood as the sole effector of our rec
onciliation to God, the individual "person
must be left out of consideration" (p. 26:
emphasis added). Although human indi
viduals are indeed agents of actions, any
and every good work that we see as being
"ours" is canceled out, and the "I yet not I"
comes into effect. As Barth states, the
work of Christ the Reconciler Spirit must
be seen
in its fundamental and immutable [unaußiebbar]
restriction of ever} thing that is our o\\ η w ork.
Wherever the action of humans in themselves, m
w hate\ er pretense or form, is made into a condi
tion of the human's fellowship with God. there
the Holy Spirit is forgotten, and there sin is
committed in order to overcome sin. (p. 20)
Where human morality, the human will or
conscience, is seen as the way to mediate
the relationship between the sinner and
God. the two aspects of reconciliation that
need to be held together—justification and
sanctification—fall away from each other.
Justification turns into a slow, gradual
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process by which the sinner thinks he or she
could become a nonsinner through the good
works that he or she performs (p. 21).
Reconciliation then becomes a matter of
the "'divine gift and man's creative action
combined in one*" (p. 22. quoting Augustine). The "I yet not I" collapses into the
willful human ego, and a substantive Christology is dissolved.
Barth was well aware of the implications of his modern epistemologica! interpretation of Luther's substantive
Christology. When it is properly understood, first, as being fully undertaken, begun, and completed in Christ's person and
work as the God-man, and further, as an
event that is outside the control of our
reasoning skills and moral abilities, the
term "Christian" must take on a very particular meaning.

of cognition that is distinct from natural
human reason, his Christology limits the
capabilities of natural human reason to
comprehend and therefore control what
God's actions are toward us. To Barth, this
meant that when it comes to the Godhuman relationship, human reason has a
distinct blind spot. Taking this blind spot
seriously means that Christians, especially
Lutherans, maintain a healthy critical distance to the process by which we weigh
matters of moral weight using our everyday reason and common sense. The "I yet
not I" as the foundation for rational thinking provides us with a critical check upon
the way we go about trying to lead lives we
would like to call Christian. Sustaining the
faith that is beyond the reach of our control
requires that Christ continually mediate
himself to us as a Subject working within
us.
Supposing w e decide to side . .. w ith Luther . ..
Finally, taking Barth's retrieval of
to proceed with caution when w e use the adjecLuther'
s Christology seriously means bringtive "Christian" and to use the word in a way
quite other than is the vogue in our victorious ing to light the falsity that lies in the conmodern Christendom. What. then, is meant by cept of an autonomous "good will" that
such phrases as "Christian" view of the universe. accompanies modem individuals* sense of
"Christian" morality. "Christian" art? What are
"Christian" personalities. "Christian" families. self. Morality never arises out of our"Christian" groups. "Christian" newspapers. selves, and moral actions always have en"Christian" societies . . . ? Who gives us per- folded within them some other hidden
mission to us the adjective so profuselv? (pp. motive and external influence, whether it
37-38)
be economic, personal, idealistic, or practical. It is clear in the theologies of both
Concluding remarks
Barth and Luther that the only external
What Barth gained from Luther's substan- factor that can actually make our good
tive Christology was a way to express the actions good is the divine influence, which
work of Christ upon the sinner that over- comes from beyond our ability to rationalcomes the human drive to relate to God as ize and control, which is mediated to us in
beings who are autonomous, reasonable, the person of the crucified Christ who conand good-willed. Luther " s tight unification tinually works upon us as God's Reconcilof Christ's person and work highlights that ing Spirit.
Christ's action as the God-man and mediator is something that is started and finished
in our lives by Christ alone. In that Luther
closely connected the person and work of
Christ with the creation of faith as a mode
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